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Introduction 
 
 
Transnational Organised Crime in 
West Africa 
More Than a Problem of Terrorism and Law Enforcement 
Judith Vorrath 
The crisis in Mali has sharpened European awareness of the dangers posed by 
transnational organised crime in West Africa. The UN Stabilisation Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) set up in July 2013 will find itself confronted with the issue as well. But 
the problem of organised crime reaches far beyond the Sahel, and affects many coastal 
states in West Africa. Nor can it be reduced to the “crime-terror nexus” and the drug 
trade. Transnational criminal activities in the region are more diverse than that, the 
challenges more complex: from piracy in the Gulf of Guinea to illegal extraction of 
natural resources, cybercrime and human trafficking. Europe is directly affected by 
these developments as a market and target, and, moreover, has a strong interest in 
West African stability. So there are various reasons for addressing the problem. How-
ever, existing efforts by the European Union and other actors to improve law enforce-
ment will fall short if they remain isolated. 
 
Organised crime in West Africa has 
acquired a new order of magnitude over 
the past decade. Precise figures are by 
nature hard to come by, but the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
estimates that since about 2005 cocaine 
smuggling from South America to Europe 
via West Africa has expanded to such an 
extent that it has come to endanger the 
stability and development of entire states. 
And indeed, the crisis in Mali and the 2012 
coup in Guinea-Bissau are both partly con-
nected with the drugs trade, especially in 
terms of the involvement of state actors. 
Organised Crime in West Africa and 
European Interests 
Although seizures of cocaine have fallen in 
recent years, according to official figures, 
most West African states remain affected by 
drug smuggling, which also includes the 
trafficking of heroin and the trade in larger 
quantities of cannabis for the local market. 
Moreover, in many places natural resources 
are illegally exploited and traded, such as 
gold from Ghana and diamonds, rubber 
and timber from Sierra Leone. The practice 
of stealing oil from pipelines for sale (“oil 
bunkering”) is prevalent in the Niger Delta. 
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Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea originally cen-
tred on Nigerian waters, but in 2011 shifted 
to Benin and later to Togo. West Africa is 
also a source, transit region and destination 
for human trafficking for coerced labour 
and sexual exploitation, while smugglers 
using extensive regional networks and vari-
ous routes via the Sahara or Senegal convey 
tens of thousands of migrants seeking to 
reach Europe every year. Alongside Central 
Africa, West Africa is additionally the con-
tinent’s biggest source of illegal financial 
outflows. 
Yet, the depth and breadth of criminal 
activity as such are not the only cause for 
concern. Organised crime is intricately 
interwoven into the political, economic and 
social fabric of West African countries. For 
two main reasons, Europe cannot ignore 
the associated challenges: Firstly, as a major 
market Europe is inexorably bound up with 
the problem of transnational organised 
crime in its “neighbourhood”. But most of 
all, German and European interventions 
in fragile and conflict-affected states are 
directly confronted with the problem with-
out being systematically prepared to deal 
with it. 
Fragility and Grey Areas for 
Organised Crime 
The intensity of transnational organised 
crime in West Africa stems from an inter-
action of various factors. Alongside growing 
integration in the global (shadow) economy 
and a generally noted internationalisation 
of criminal networks, specific aspects also 
play a role; these include West Africa’s 
geographical location and regional eco-
nomic integration in the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS), 
as well as the underdeveloped regulatory 
capacities, weak law enforcement, per-
meable borders and high rates of corrup-
tion that create incentives for criminal 
actors in many of the region’s countries. 
Yet the relationship between state fragil-
ity and organised crime is very complex, 
with smaller fragile states frequently func-
tioning as transit zones while economically 
more solid neighbours with major urban 
centres, like Ghana or Nigeria, often serve 
as bases for organised crime operations like 
cyberfraud (including advance fee fraud, 
“419 scams”) and favoured places to invest 
the profits of crime. The harm caused is 
not restricted to the loss of state revenue; 
rather organised crime has repercussions 
on state and society as a whole. 
Three grey areas are especially pro-
nounced in fragile states. Firstly, it is hardly 
possible to distinguish “state” and “non-
state” spheres in many places. Patronage 
and clientelism are widespread in West 
Africa, public offices often entangled with 
private interests. The importance of per-
sonal relationships and informal networks 
gives rise to hybrid forms of governance 
that facilitate the corruption or infiltration 
of state institutions by criminal actors. 
Incidents of direct participation by state 
actors or persons close to them are also 
regularly uncovered, one notable case being 
Ousmane Conté, arrested in 2009 shortly 
after the death of his father, the Guinean 
president, and named a “drug kingpin” by 
the United States in 2010. 
A second grey area arises at the inter-
section of war and peace. As the 2011 World 
Development Report emphasises, many 
“post-conflict” states find themselves con-
fronted with repeated cycles of political 
and criminal violence. Most West African 
countries have experienced armed conflict 
since the 1990s, and the concomitant war 
economies have often transformed after the 
official ending of hostilities, rather than 
completely disappearing. A civil war also 
leaves arms circulating uncontrolled and 
many ex-combatants lacking employment 
prospects. Transnational organised crime 
networks can exploit such unstable “post-
conflict” phases to gain a foothold and 
become another source of violence. Cocaine 
smuggling in West Africa has not to date 
involved the levels of violence seen in Latin 
America, but political acts of violence like 
the 2009 assassination of the president and 
the armed forces chief of staff in Guinea-
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Bissau are certainly linked to the drugs 
trade. 
Thirdly, the dividing line between in-
formal and criminal business is extremely 
blurred. The regular and irregular econ-
omies are always closely interwoven, but 
in West Africa a large slice of economic 
activity takes place in the informal sector. 
Thus, commerce largely proceeds without 
formal state intervention; customary prac-
tices and personal (often cross-border) net-
works define business relations. Here, the 
step from legal to illegal activity is small 
and not necessarily perceived as such by 
those involved. At least, many smuggling 
activities are legitimate in the eyes of 
local populations. Transnational organised 
crime groups also frequently make use of 
existing networks and routes such as the 
ancient Tuareg salt route across the Sahara 
to Algeria. In such contexts it is particu-
larly hard to identify where informal prac-
tices end and (organised) criminal activi-
ties begin. These complex manifestations 
of organised crime in West Africa are 
not amenable to simplistic isolated solu-
tions. 
Isolated Action Is Inadequate 
Organised crime amplifies the problems of 
fragile states, especially as criminal actors 
usually resort to corruption and violence 
when necessary to defend their business in-
terests. Important as it is to fight organised 
crime, isolated measures will not produce 
results. In some cases they may even make 
matters worse. The repercussions of orga-
nised crime on peace and security, gover-
nance, statehood and socio-economic 
development cannot be tackled using the 
familiar approaches of law enforcement 
alone. Many lessons can be learned from 
Latin America in particular, where police 
and security forces have themselves been 
involved in criminal activities and pose or 
posed a security threat in some areas. 
In fragile states criminal activity can 
also open up access to income and status 
for certain parts of the population that 
see few alternatives. Although profits are 
generally the priority, criminal actors do 
sometimes seek to accumulate social and 
political capital by providing services to 
communities. The Ghanaian politician Eric 
Amoateng, who was arrested in 2005 in 
the United States for heroin smuggling 
and later jailed, is a notorious example. 
His arrest provoked demonstrations in his 
constituency, and in 2011 he was honoured 
by local “chiefs” for his contribution to 
development in the district. He had funded 
road-building, provided stipends and 
granted interest-free loans for a community 
that had been largely isolated and impover-
ished. Where criminal actors meet a need 
with such “charity” they may generate 
genuine local support. 
In West Africa, as elsewhere, the term 
“organised crime” stands for a plethora of 
different actor constellations. Professional, 
flexible transnational groups adapt quickly 
to changing conditions, for example if law 
enforcement is stepped up. Others, such as 
urban gangs and groups exploiting natural 
resources in a particular region, are more 
locally tied, with a “locational advantage” 
hindering their ability to simply shift their 
radius of activity. Armed groups also fre-
quently combine political or ideological 
objectives with profit-seeking, whereby the 
primary motivation is not always clear and 
may change over time. Consequently, actor-
centred approaches may be problematic 
and particular routes, commodities or en-
vironments may offer better starting points 
for fighting organised crime. 
Challenges for Germany and Europe 
Europe has a wealth of experience in deal-
ing with organised crime and its conse-
quences. West Africa can certainly profit 
from European insights on the possibilities 
and limits of law enforcement and cross-
border collaboration. However, this would 
also require an exchange of experiences 
from different policy fields within Germany 
and Europe to connect expertise on crime-
fighting and prevention with operative les-
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sons from various approaches in fragile 
states. 
At the same time, existing programmes 
and strategies must be adapted. Since 
2009 the EU’s Cocaine Route Programme 
has been supporting projects to fight inter-
national criminal networks in thirty-six 
states of Latin America, the Caribbean and 
(West) Africa. But like many other initia-
tives it relies overwhelmingly on law en-
forcement. At a conference on the Cocaine 
Route Programme held in May 2013 the 
European Union itself underlined the 
necessity of including questions of gover-
nance and development as well as regional 
actors like the African Union. Concretely 
that could mean including the issue of 
organised crime in existing cooperation 
schemes such as the Joint Africa-EU Strat-
egy of 2007 that provides the framework for 
partnerships in all relevant fields, above all 
peace and security, governance and human 
rights, as well as regional integration. An 
inter-continental dialogue could further 
heighten awareness of the dangers emanat-
ing from organised crime. The problem 
as such is increasingly recognised in the 
region, as demonstrated by various activi-
ties at the level of ECOWAS and the West 
Africa Commission on Drugs launched in 
January 2013 and chaired by former Nige-
rian president Olusegun Obasanjo. How-
ever, it is still early days for these initiatives 
and circumstances in the individual coun-
tries differ enormously. External actors 
need to take this into account. Projects and 
operations must at least avoid side-effects 
that tend to further stimulate organised 
crime instead of reducing or containing it. 
That means keeping in mind the polit-
ical economy of conflict and the limited 
capacity, control and legitimacy of many 
West African states. So international actors 
in fragile states must be provided with in-
struments for adequate analysis, and exper-
tise as well as training with a specific focus 
on organised crime must be integrated into 
existing processes. Measures to reform the 
justice and security sectors, to enhance 
the rule of law, and to prevent or contain 
communal violence can also make an im-
portant contribution to strengthening the 
resilience of West African states. 
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